A few months ago the famine on the Horn of Africa reached media and attained daily attention in news and talk shows over the world. NGOs increased their efforts to raise money and awareness. Governments propped up their support. Celebrities flocked. Governments and NGOs were, as usual, accused of reacting and reaching out too late and slow and simultaneously for not controlling the distribution of food sufficiently. Also as usual.

Dadaab in north-eastern Kenya was the centre of attention; the refugee camp was designed for 90,000 and now harbours more than half a million Somalis. Mogadishu also saw a large influx of starving people from surrounding rural areas. Ethiopia received huge numbers of Somali refugees, on top of their own population that was at risk, roughly 4 million. Estimates put possible deaths at 6 digit figures, numbers unheard of for decades and equalling the death tolls during Pol Pot in Cambodia and the Rwandan genocide.

Focus was initially on the shortfall of rain in the region leading to loss of grain production and later famine, but it shifted fairly rapidly to the more political aspects of the crisis.

Al Shabaab was singled out as the main human factor triggering off the humanitarian disaster with large scale suffering. This militant islamist force had controlled central and southern Somalia; it had ‘taxed’ the population, forcibly recruited boys to its militia, and it controlled important segments of the local production—such as charcoal.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was seen as one of the crucial factors obviating a long term solution; Ethiopia had intervened in Somalia in 2006 in collaboration with the western-backed Transitional Federal Government which gave rise to local resistance and ultimately to al Shabaab. Eritrea was seen as opposing anything in Somalia that would be in Ethiopia´s interest, and was thus supporting Al Shabaab in its fight with TFG.

The situation on the Horn has rapidly changed in recent weeks, with focus on new actors and new interventions. The limelight is not on the famine, but on the political and military situation. And the perspective is now regional, not national.

Al Shabaab was ousted from Mogadishu in October by the AU force Amisom, consisting of soldiers from Burundi and Uganda, with the support of forces from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. A fragile peace was established in the capital, torn from fighting and run down from lack of management of basic facilities and maintenance of public and private property for decades.

Al Shabaab retreated southwards, threatening to come back or to return with new forms or methods of retaliation. That is not an empty threat; they have made a lethal attack in Uganda, as a revenge for Uganda’s involvement. And they have come back, so far in small attacks, but now in the traditionally peaceful and resilient Kenya. Abduction of tourists and aid workers had the calculated negative effects on the Kenyan tourist industry, a large earner of foreign currency.

Kenya retaliated with unexpected force. They invaded southern Somalia with 3000 ground troops, (including embedded journalists), support from the air force and deployment of the navy to protect the coast. Since this is the first time that they are at war, it was a surprise move; the Kenyan public did not expect it, nor did the region, and probably not al Shabaab.

The Kenyan public though, seems to support the move. It is clear that there is a strong resentment of having a fragile, or rather failed, state as a neighbour. Everything is now blamed on the Somalis, just as many things in Botswana or South Africa are blamed on the influx of Zimbabweans.

The parliament is endorsing the war. They were not formally consulted prior to the invasion, but had a meeting in camera where, according to reports, no one spoke against the military intervention.

In Nairobi today, there are few signs of the war effort. Daily life seems to continue undisturbed. Even Eastleigh in Nairobi, dominated by business and Somalis, seems tranquil, dirty, busy, commercial, – exactly as before. But security is heightened at public places and car boot sales have been cancelled, which illustrates an increased awareness of possible threats. In the media there are of course discussions on the ultimate objectives of this effort, and on the viability of these objectives.

The UN with support from the US (or vice versa?) tried to install peace in Somalia in 1994. They failed. The Ethiopians ditto in 2006. Why should a country with much smaller armed forces succeed?

It is clear what Kenya wants: A neighbour that is in no way a threat to Kenyan industry; be it beer, cement, oil or tourism. That is why Kenya has been active in hosting various peace negotiations, to no avail, leading to increased Kenyan frustration.

The objective with the invasion seems to be to create a peaceful buffer zone on the Somali side of the border. If clan conflicts in Somalia would lead to three or four separate Somali states, such as Somaliland today and maybe Puntland tomorrow, this would not be running against the Kenyan interest, as long as they function. That could also be in the Ethiopian interest; having small and weak countries as neighbours, rather than a conflict ridden havoc creating larger Somalia.

The Kenyan incursion into Somalia has also brought the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea to the surface. Kenya has formally accused Eritrea for supporting al Shabaab, which Asmara vehemently denies. From Eritrea’s point of view, the accusations are bad news: They strengthen the links between Kenya and Ethiopia and the Eritrean isolation increases.

The humanitarian crisis continues, even if there are signs that it is not worsening. The influx into Dadaab has slowed down. But the situation in the camp is very serious with fear for increased spreading of diseases. International aid organizations have left after the abduction of aid workers. The ongoing rains might lead to increased food production next year, if the political situation allows for it.

There are few short term humanitarian crises; their causes are often structural and their consequences for shattered societies, capacity for food production and weakened human bodies last long.