Africa vs. Southeast Asia
Economic growth and leadership succession
August 14, 2012
There is growing speculation about the fate of Ethiopia’s leader Meles Zenawi. Has a leadership struggle started? The way this plays out will have profound implications for the fortunes of a country with one of Africa’s largest populations and fastest growing economies.
Sub-Saharan Africa has had nine high-growth regimes with annual average growth rates of 7% or more since 1960, whereas the much wealthier region SE Asia has had only six. However, African high-growth regimes tend to be fairly short-lived.
In SE Asia, most high-growth regimes have spanned changes in political leadership, whereas in Africa only one country has achieved this. Why? This article explains the decisive differences in economic policy-making institutions and/or political leadership traditions.
So what are the implications for Ethiopia or other African high-growth regimes like Uganda or Rwanda? If they are to avoid the fate of other high-growth but short-lived regimes, they must now invent a binding order of succession.
In recent days there has been fevered speculation across the internet about the fate of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, and the leadership struggle liable to follow his—as yet unconfirmed—demise. (An excellent overview is provided here.) The way this struggle plays out will have profound implications for the fortunes of a country with one of Africa’s largest populations, and fastest growing economies.
At the Developmental Regimes in Africa project, we have been finding that how a country handles its succession process is crucial to political stability and economic growth, and that traditionally, African countries have managed this process rather poorly.
Sub-Saharan Africa, it may surprise some readers to know, has not been short of high-growth regimes―defined as a regime with a decadal annual average growth rate of 7% or more. Since 1960 it has had nine, whereas Southeast Asia, a much wealthier region, has had only six.
However, it will come as less of a surprise to know that African high-growth regimes tend to be fairly short-lived. A typical high-growth regime in Africa lasts for 13 years, whereas in Southeast Asia it lasts for 23.
Associated with this fact is that in Southeast Asia, high-growth regimes in Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have all spanned changes in political leadership, whereas in Africa, only one country—Mozambique—has achieved this.
The question is why?
One answer might be that Southeast Asian states have been comparatively free of the authoritarianism, corruption, cronyism, and nepotism that afflicts so many African countries—but it is actually more complicated than this. Anyone familiar with Southeast Asian governance knows that it often falls well short of good governance ideals.
Rather, what seems to distinguish successful Southeast Asian regimes from African ones, is that economic policy-making is either entrusted to a bureaucracy that is effectively insulated from the hurly-burly of leadership politics (as in Thailand during the 1960s and 1970s), or political leaders are embedded in strong political parties with traditions of consensual decision making and clear conventions governing leadership succession (Malaysia in the 1970s, Vietnam in the 1990s, Laos today).
This explanation also fits our successful African case, Mozambique, which has a strong governing party, FRELIMO, with succession conventions established following the assassination of its first President, Eduardo Mondlane.
It also helps explain why our only Southeast Asian outlier, General Suharto’s Indonesia, was unable to sustain the 26 years of high growth experienced under his rule. In Indonesia, the bureaucracy was less insulated than in Thailand, while the ruling Golkar was weaker than other parties in the region.
So what are the implications for Ethiopia (or other high-growth regimes like Uganda or Rwanda, for that matter)? The good news, from a developmental point of view, is that Ethiopia is fortunate to have a ruling party stronger than that in many other African states—so there is at least a chance that growth will continue. The bad news is that it is far from clear that the EPRDF is as robust as Mozambique’s Frelimo, Malaysia’s UMNO, or the Vietnamese Communist Party, while the apparent absence of an obvious successor or clear conventions governing the succession process is an obvious cause for concern.
If it is to avoid the fate of other high-growth but short-lived regimes, the EPRDF must now invent a binding a succession tradition, with or without Meles at the helm.
This is a slightly edited version of the original post on the blog The political economy of development in Africa.
Let us not forget that the EPRDF’s political nucleus – the TPLF – like FRELIMO is not unfamiliar with leadership succession. Unlike FRELIMO’s however, such succession has not triggered by death, but something as unusual (for armed insurgency movements) as a procedural correct ousting of the old leadership on political grounds. Other constituent parties of the EPRDF have also all at different times had leadership succession, although these have not been as politically significant.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the EPRDF is at a late stage of an already adopted and mostly implemented succession plan, that would see its chairperson – the prime minister – resign at the end of this parliamentary term. Surely EPRDF is not totally unprepared for whatever may come.
Having said that, there are no guarantees against the derailing of this succession process. Obviously, factional infighting is more likely at such politically sensitive times, but such hypothetical infighting would have to be explained in terms of social divisions rather than “the apparent absence of an obvious successor or clear conventions governing the succession process”.
Dear Andreas, Thanks for this informative point. I wonder if you can share something of how the TPLF managed its first succession?
The author has totally misunderstood changes (?) in Southeast Asia. It’s no model for Africa.
Dear Karl-Anders, Thanks for your opinion. Please do try and falsify my thesis by supplying some facts.
Tim
Dear Tim,
Former TPLF Chairman Aregawi Berhe and Vice chairman were expelled from the Politbureau (and later the front altogether) at a Central Committee plenary session meeting in July 1985. A leftist group emerging from the front’s political department and cadre school used the formation of the front’s Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray to oust the former leadership. This marked Meles Zenawi’s rise to prominence within the leadership, and he replaced nominal Chairman Sebhat Nega (who remained within the TPLF leadership) some years later. Although some dissenters appeared within the front, the changes were communicated top-down and readily accepted by the large majority of members. One can hardly say that the front’s fighting ability or coherence were negatively affected, as the period marked the transition to a much more offensive footing. Keeping in mind that Aregawi has an axe to grind with his former comrade-in-arms, his detailed version of the events are useful, and can be found at this link:
http://harep.org/ifaapr/7219.pdf
Many thanks. That’s an interesting story that I didn’t know.
I would say the implications are mixed. On the one hand, the rank and file accept the leadership decision and the organization’s effectiveness is unaffected. On the other hand, there is a bruising leadership challenge with the potential to create enmity and uncertainty.
Contrast this with, say, Vietnam, where Ho Chi Minh instilled an ethos of collective leadership and consensual decision-making in the Politburo, such that on his death, power was shared, with no individual able simultaneously to hold a top government post and the position of party leader.
Contrast also to Malaysia, perhaps the most conflictual of our successful SEA cases, where Dato Onn, UMNO’s first leader, lost the support of other top leaders in the early 1950s on account of his proposed concessions to non-Malay communities. However, rather than unceremoniously ousting him, they applied discreet pressure and he resigned relatively gracefully in 1951. In 1969, when his successor Tunku Abdul Rahman lost the support of his peers in 1969, he again was allowed to resign in a dignified manner in 1970, while Mahathir Mohamed, who had publicly challenged him, was expelled from the Party (only to be invited back into the fold by Rahman’s successor, Tun Abdul Razak).
Thanks in part to this convention of orderly succession, and the oft-repeated mantra that UMNO members owed a duty of obedience to the leader, there was no serious challenge to the UMNO party leader until 1987. This undoubtedly helped investor confidence and was a factor (though certainly not the only factor) in Malaysia’s >7% growth 1961-84.
It will be interesting to see if the TPLF/EPRDF can manage the succession in such an orderly way.
PS I am also encouraged by the idea that EPRDF has an ‘already adopted and mostly implemented succession plan’.
It is not speculation anymore. State media confirmed his death today. But one should never underestimate the nature of Ethiopian people overcomming hazardious political mine-fields throughout their estimated 3000 years long history, again and again, and despite the fact that Ethiopia is a home of more than 100 hugely varried nations and nationalities.
Tim, you saw it coming and here it is!
I am not sure whether the Ethiopian regime had read your piece let alone heed your call. The relevant question therefore is: will there be a traumatic transition? The bits and pieces coming from Addis Ababa are quite encouraging. They seem to lend support to Dawit’s faith in the Ethiopians people, at least, for now.
There may be some bumpy rides along the way particularly getting to the next election. This is the time for the international community to start engaging the power brokers in Ethiopia behind the scene. Quiet diplomacy is the key phrase here and the avoidance of open directives should be a priority.
The second question beyond the transition is: will there be a reversal of the recent growth in Ethiopia? There are no indications that the economic team that Mele assembled will be dismantled immediately. His Vice is now the interim head of government. Of course, the markets are nervous but the figures from the Ethiopian Stock Exchange do not indicate panic.
I am cautiously optimistic.
James,
I hope you’re right and I think the signs are encouraging. It’s possible that Desalegne is a genuinely consensual candidate with the ability to balance Tigrayans, Amharas, minorities etc. The experience of some other regionally/ethnically divided countries e.g. Laos, suggests that so long as there is sufficient consensus about overall economic policy this kind of balancing act can work. However, other commentary seems to suggest that Desalegne may be just a placeholder (albeit a sensible one) for a more intense leadership contest unfolding behind the scenes. From the point of view of economic growth what’s important is that the eventual leader emerges quickly and that all the factions get behind him (or her?).