Meles Zenawi was the de facto leader of Ethiopia from 1991 until his recent death. He was known for his repressive and intolerant leadership style that jailed dissident journalists, killed hundreds of opposition members and protesters, and forced numerous Ethiopians into exile.

At the same time, Zenawi’s successful economic and social development policies are hard to ignore with realistic claims of 11% annual growth since 2004, a revived agricultural sector with much improved food security, rapid poverty reduction and a (mostly) honest and well intended use of donor funds.

Some commentators have expressed concerns that the fragility of Ethiopia, which Zenawi managed to hold together, could leave a power vacuum—especially considering the irredentist ambitions of Somalia and persistent grievances emanating from Eritrea.

However, Zenawi’s party is by no means ’monolithic’ and even though plans were apparently in motion for a leadership transition in the near future, but it is likely that Zenawi was planning to solidify himself as the head of his the state anyway. Moreover, it is important to mention that few historical precedents exist in Ethiopia to help guide this transition process along, complicating the situation further.

Despite these concerns, the death of Zenawi highlights general issues of political succession and legitimacy in ‘Big Men’ states. Serious observers of the current political climate in Ethiopia should pay careful attention to individuals posturing their authority in this unsettling climate, and be less enamored by whoever ascends to fill the Prime Minister post due to some guideline in the constitution that no one has ever paid attention to in the first place.

Informal Networks
Zenawi, like many Big Men, rose to power through informal networks from outside the formal state structure. And he maintained his control by pumping money, opportunity, jobs, and any other kind of reward into these informal structures by pillaging the formal state, or through strict application of military against opposition.

For its part, the informal networks supported Zenawi so long as the wealth and opportunity flowed. However, importantly, with the death of Zenawi the informal network, of which he was previously the head, is now shifting and someone must come to the fore to fill this void.

Nevertheless, informal networks are typically very complex—making the next Big Man hard to predict. Mats Utas, a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, described informal networks in his book, African Conflicts and Informal Power as, “an intricate latticework of collaborative ventures…and consist of relations that are enduring but by no means permanent.”

In the case of Ethiopia this translates into a sophisticated constellation of formal and informal interests from the military, private sector, civic groups, rebels, consumers, farmers, and financial institutions. These entities come together in precise and indirect ways which may not be totally apparent to even the ordinary Ethiopian citizens, let alone casual foreign observers.

‘Second Fiddles’ and Patrimonial Networks
Zenawi was an institution in and of himself, but he did not stand on his own. As in most Big Men regimes there are ’second fiddles’—individuals who are acting primarily behind the scenes and, because they have aggregated enough authority and following, have become major forces in the political and economic landscape.

These individuals could range from, depending on the country, career military officers, tribal leaders, insurgents or rebels, Parlimentarians, or a relative of another power broker. Importantly, second fiddles do not necessarily need to come from, in this case, Zenawi’s inner circle because of the diverse nature of informal social relations and political pragmatism in Big Men regimes.

Moreover, the individual who eventually ’replaces’ Zenawi may, or may not, ascend to the role of Prime Minister; more critical is filling the all-important void in the informal patrimonial network that Zenawi left behind.

In my opinion, Western observers in general have yet to fully realize the omnipresence of informal power and its role in the function of contemporary political and social life in Africa. The mischaracterization of Africa by many observers had led to a lack of appreciation of behind-the-scenes power brokers which makes analysis of formal political regimes and leadership incomplete.

The Relationship Between Big Men and Second Fiddles
As Anders Themner described in African Conflicts and Informal Power, “actors such as paramount chiefs, warlords, politicians and businessmen have much sway over societal affairs. The authority of these elites, or Big Men, stems from their ability to create networks of dependents that can be mobilized to acquire power, resources, and concessions.”

In my view, differing somewhat from this interpretation of Big Men as “nodes in the informal network”, most of these nodes are actually those individuals playing second fiddle to the Big Man.

This distinction should not be taken as to claim that the Big Man stands alone. But due to the complexity and inter-reliance of the informal networks, Big Men will most certainly need to strike deals, or even on some occasions bow down to interests of these second fiddles to maintain their power.

Moreover, the resource limitations of the state mean that a certain level of distribution to these informal networks must take place through these second fiddles to keep the state and network bound and functioning.

In short, a cunning Big Man will take the lion’s share of state resources for himself but also ensure that enough wealth is flowing to the informal networks and second fiddles to secure his position as the Big Man. However, there are alternatives.

In instances where the Big Man either cannot bring a powerful second fiddle into his patrimonial network, or refuses to try, he may utilize force and violence to legitimize his role as the Big Man.

The relationship between Big Men and second fiddles does not have to be marked by frustration and tension however, nor would it be fair to claim that second fiddles are powerlessly subjugated below the Big Man—rather second fiddles are simultaneously establishing the Big Man, and aggressive in their desire to generate more wealth and authority.

Moving Forward without a Big Man
Although Zenawi’s successor Hailemariam Desalegn is in control of the country, it remains to be seen which of the second fiddles in the now shifting Ethiopian power structures are vying to ascend as the next Big Man. Unfortunately, political transition in Africa has developed the reputation of being more of a tournament-style moment, with various personalities all gunning to occupy that number one slot.

Ethiopia is surely no exception to this, particularly since there is little doubt that there are second fiddles that have waited eagerly for a bigger piece of the action during Zenawi’s long reign. Commentators of African affairs would do well to observe how Ethiopia recovers from this political theater, and not only note who replaces Zenawi but how they ascend to that role.