The Road Forward for Somalia
Challenges for the Post-Transitional Government
Somalia has ended 20 year-long era of transitional and interim administrations that spawned statelessness, protracted conflicts, political vacuum and warlordism.
The aim for post-transitional government is mainly to let Somalia stand on its own – politically and militarily – with a four-year mandate to structure and lay the groundwork for prosperity.
Somali leaders are to blame for inviting external actors to settle internal disputes. Neighboring countries must agree on a coherent and constructive strategy for stabilizing Somalia, one that respects its sovereignty and forswears interventions.
The greater international donor community should support Somalia’s plan for stability, governance and development. Its interest is a stable Somalia at peace with itself and the world. This means departing from the securitization approach to more long term economic development.
Somalia has ended 20 year-long era of transitional and interim administrations that spawned statelessness, protracted conflicts, political vacuum and warlordism.
After more than two decades, the country has assumed its full responsibility of post transitional government, adopted a new – federal – Constitution, installed a new president and a prime minister, and downsized parliament.
Given Somali’s recent past, this was a historic and generational moment.
Basically, the new post-transitional government is responsible, with help of international partners, for its state and security. Already Somali forces are ramping up their operations. Together with coalition partners, they have begun to take over key towns from the insurgents, notably Kismayo – the third largest city in Somalia and al-Shabaab’s biggest revenue-generating town.
The aim for post-transitional government is, in essence, to let Somalia stand on its own – politically and militarily – with a four-year mandate to structure and lay the groundwork for a prosperous Somalia. The African Union has already formally proposed to the UN to lift the arms embargo in order to enable the new government to look after its own security.
Further, the appointment of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, a longtime civil society activist came as total surprise to many Somalis who feared a repeat of status quo in the presidential election. He represents a new – and genuine – leader who seeks to resuscitate Somalia from the quagmire.
His appointment was itself a rare moment for Somalia; unlike previous governments where the presidents and parliamentarians were cooked outside and parachuted on the ground, he was appointed in the capital Mogadishu and thus enjoys a degree of legitimacy.
This new political momentum was only possible with the courage of the previous transitional government who, despite all its setbacks, paved the way for responsible transition. Of equal importance was the international community’s unflagging commitment to concluding the roadmap process that yielded this nascent transformation.
Looking ahead as the dust begins to settle slowly, successful transition is not in the offing. Some fundamental facts remain unchanged; government institutions are woefully dysfunctional, insecurity has reached unacceptable levels, Somali forces are heavily dependent on AMISOM ‘s assistance every step of the way, the government is bankrupt.
And despite al-Shabaab being severely degraded, they still remain a very potent force that controls a sizable swath of territory in the central part of Somalia. The country remains under sway of competing foreign powers.
Addressing these challenges will not be easy, but keeping them in mind will help the president to avoid his administration becoming another futile government.
Security and Stability
First and most important is the security. For the last few weeks, countless people have been killed including seven journalists, politicians and district commissioners, showing how the security situation remains very tenuous.
Moreover, al-Shabaab are hiding among the local people, intimidating and killing journalists and government officials. Their assassinations and hit-and-run tactic still remain a lethal threat to the population.
The new government, for its part, must encourage local residents to report suspicious moves, and enforce the local government systems. The last government, to its credit, managed fairly well in collaborating with local populations to ensure community-centered security.
For years, the main challenge has been to tackle the widespread insecurity, which is the biggest source of instability in Somalia.
Most dangerously, as reported by the UK based think-tank the Saferworld, a staggering number of Somali police work for private companies and individuals, largely due to the government’s inability to pay their salaries.
This will certainly deteriorate and contribute to the worsening security situation on the ground. In addition, the young defectors should be incorporated into the army. They’ve a bright future in defending their country.
Surely, rebuilding Somali national security forces requires determination and a realistic plan. As the president has rightly acknowledged, improving the quality and the morale of Somalia army and police, and strengthening central and regional administrations should be the first order of business.
Governance Institutions
At the moment, Somalia lacks functional government institutions, despite numerous transitional governments that were often paralyzed by infighting and persistent corruption.
For many Somalis, previous governments were nothing but power-hungry and greedy individuals with no interest in building civic institutions. And as result, every government became, by and large, irrelevant.
For the local population, government is about security, water, health and education. If the new government fails to install these basic institutions, and I pray not, it too will become irrelevant.
Kismayo
is by far the most complex issue of the day in Somalia. Obviously, the fall of Kismayo has dealt a huge blow to al-Shabaab, but it’s a harbinger of more sinister things to come: the intensification of deep-seated inter-ethnic rifts.
Historically, Kismayo has been a multi-ethnic region with no specific clan configuration. It’s a very complex place with diverse local realities.
While the coalition troops have successful toppled al-Shabaab, the real test is now whether they will succeed in building an effective local governance system – some kind of tribal local structure that fills the vacuum and provides the basic services to the local people.
A more dangerous and problematic issue is the Jubaland Initiative driven by Nairobi, evoking long-established regional rivalries between Kenya and Ethiopia. The fall of Kismayo will only intensify the regional rivalries – directly or by proxy – to the detriment of the new government.
Furthermore, the role of the Mogadishu government has been blatantly undermined, adding fuel to the already deep-rooted suspicion by the Somali government of Kenya’s motives regarding Kismayo.
To avert future fallout, the role of the regional inter-governmental body IGAD is critical for coordinating and providing frameworks for cooperation between the stakeholders.
Talks with Al-Shabaab
Unlike his predecessor, President Hassan has a realistic narrative towards negotiating with al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is made up of two camps – nationalist (Somalis) and global Jihadist (foreign) – with different views on peace negotiations.
Among the former, there are many frustrated and disoriented youths, who the president rightly wants to bring into the process.
Then, there is a small but quite powerful global Jihadist hard-core contingent whose vision for Somalia, among other things, is to become a launching pad for terrorist activity and keep Somalia in anarchy for their own benefit and safety. There can be no room for accommodation with this camp.
To avoid past mistakes, the president needs to articulate his negotiation strategy. A blank-check negotiation won’t help; the president must appoint an interlocutor or governmental body to spearhead the process. Of course, negotiating with militants is always very tough and rough.
External Players
Even if Somalis agree on a broad-based internal political settlement, the country still needs an external political settlement as well. This is where the international community’s role comes to mind. For years, Somalis and non-Somalis alike have criticized the external interferences in Somalia’s internal affairs.
Aside from the external elements, Somali leaders are to blame for inviting external actors to settle internal disputes. This practice was notorious in the past government.
Neighboring countries, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti need to agree on a coherent and constructive strategy for stabilizing Somalia, one that respects its sovereignty and forswears interventions.
The greater international donor community should support, with no strings attached, Somalia’s plan for stability, governance and development. At the end of it, the international community’s interest is a stable Somalia at peace with itself and the world. This means departing from the securitization approach to more long term economic development.
The importance of minimizing foreign intervention has been recognized by many, including the eminent Somalia scholar Ken Menkhus, who at a recent Nairobi Forum stated: “As Somalis are sick and tired of statelessness, perpetual conflicts, warlordism and piracy they’re, equally, sick and tired of us – the international community”.